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ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS BY A WASHINGTON
SPECIAL INQUIRY JUDGE-State v. Neslund, 103 Wn. 2d 79, 690
P.2d 1153 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1971, the Washington special inquiry judge pro-
cedure has operated virtually without constitutional challenge.1 However,
the recent case of State v. Neslund2 raised the issue of whether a special
inquiry judge can properly act as a neutral and detached magistrate to issue
search warrants.
The United States Constitution and the Washington State Constitution
set forth basic guarantees of privacy and fairness, including the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 Generally a "reasonable"
search must be accompanied by a search warrant 4 issued upon a determina-
tion of probable cause 5 by a neutral and detached magistrate. 6
This Note examines the Washington special inquiry system and consid-
ers the statutory and constitutional constraints placed upon a judge who
issues search warrants subsequent to presiding over a special inquiry
investigation. The issues raised in Neslund have not previously been
addressed by the Washington courts, nor have they arisen under similar
statutes in other states.7 The Note concludes that Neslund was correct in
holding that a special inquiry judge should not be automatically dis-
qualified from issuing search warrants.
1. The only previous controversy concerning the Washington special inquiry process was resolved
by State v. Manning, 86 Wn. 2d 272, 543 P.2d 632 (1975), in which the Washington Supreme Court
determined that the special inquiry investigation could be used only to gather information prior to
charging. This Note addresses the only other major controversy concerning the Washington special
inquiry process that has arisen in appellate case law.
2. 103 Wn. 2d 79, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
5. Id.
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
7. Similar statutes exist in Michigan, MIcH. CowP. LAWS § 767.3 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.943
(Callaghan 1978)), and Connecticut, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 54-47, 54-47a (West Supp. 1985).
Neither state has addressed the issue of whether a search warrant may be issued by the judge serving as a
one-person grand jury, the Michigan and Connecticut counterpart to the Washington special inquiry
judge.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Washington Special Inquiry Procedure
In 1971, based upon a report of the Washington State Judicial Council, 8
the Washington state legislature enacted the Criminal Investigatory Act of
1971.9 This Act set forth the procedures for grand jury investigations and
created the special inquiry as an alternative to the grand jury. 10 The
Washington special inquiry procedure was patterned after the Michigan
one-person grand jury"I and is similar to the Connecticut statute. 12
8. WASHINGTON JUD. COUNCIL, 22d Biennial Report 16-28 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as JUD.
COUNCIL REP.]. The Washington State Judicial Council was established in 1925. 1925 WASH. LAWS Ex.
SEss. 38 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 2.52.010-.080 (1983)). The statute grants the
Council broad power to suggest to the courts, the governor and the state legislature revision of rules and
procedures which relate to the judicial system. Id.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.010-.190 (1983).
10. Id.
11. JUD. COUNCIL REP., supra note 8, at 17-18; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.3 (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28.943-.945 (Callaghan 1978)). The Michigan statute differs from the Washington statute in that a
Michigan one-person grand jury investigation may be initiated whenever ajudge finds probable cause to
suspect a crime, offense or misdemeanor "by reason of the filing of any complaint ... or upon the
application of the prosecuting attorney or attorney general." MICH. CoMP. LAws§ 767.3 (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.943 (Callaghan 1978)). The investigation is under the control of the judge, not the
prosecuting attorney or attorney general. In re Hickerson, 301 Mich. 278, 3 N.W.2d 274, 276 (1942). A
Michigan one-person grand jury personally issues subpoenas to compel the appearance of witnesses.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.3 (MICH. STAT. AtNN.§ 28.943 (Callaghan 1978)).
Actions required at the conclusion of a Michigan one-person grand jury investigation vary signifi-
cantly from those prescribed under the Washington special inquiry provisions. Upon finding probable
cause to suspect a person has committed a crime, the judge serving as a one-person grand jury "may
cause the apprehension of such person." Id. at § 767.44 (MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 28.944 (Callaghan
1978)). If the judge finds probable cause to believe that a public officer is guilty of an offense prescribed
as ground for removal from office, the judge must make a written finding and serve it upon the person or
body having jurisdiction to conduct removal proceedings against the officer. Id. If the judge makes "no
presentment of crime or wrongdoing" as a result of the inquiry, the judge may, with consent of the
person named in the inquiry, file "a report of no finding of criminal guilt." Id.
A Michigan judge serving as a one-person grand jury is disqualified from acting as the
examining magistrate in connection with the hearing on the complaint or indictment, or from
presiding at any trial arising therefrom, or from hearing any motion to dismiss or quash any
complaint or indictment, or from hearing any charge of contempt. . . except alleged contempt
for neglect or refusal to appear in response to a summons or subpoena.
Id. There is no language in the Michigan statute that may be construed to disqualify the judge serving as
a one-person grand jury from issuing search warrants.
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-47 (West Supp. 1985). The Connecticut one-person grand jury
provisions also vary substantially from the Washington special inquiry judge provisions. Connecticut
one-person grand jury inquiries may be either public or private, at the discretion of the court or chief
court administrator. Id. at § 54-47(c). Such investigations may be commenced "[wihenever it appears
to the superior court . . . that the administration of justice requires an investigation," or upon
application of the chief state's attorney and the deputy chief state's attorney. Id. at §§ 54-47(a) to
-47(b).
Like the one-person grand jury under the Michigan system, the Connecticut one-person grand jury
procedure is under the control of the presiding judge. Witnesses are examined by the judge, or by other
948
Special Inquiry Judge .
Under the Washington Criminal Investigatory Act, a special inquiry
proceeding consists of a hearing or a series of hearings before a superior
court judge. The judge is designated as the special inquiry judge for the
county by a majority vote of the superior court judges in that county. 13 At
special inquiry hearings any corporate counsel, prosecuting attorney, or
attorney general may call and question persons who might have information
regarding crime or corruption within the jurisdiction. 14 The special inquiry
provides law enforcement officers with an opportunity to gather informa-
tion concerning crime or corruption. 15 Use of the special inquiry is limited
to investigations in which charges have not yet been filed. 16
As envisioned by Judicial Council's proposal, the function of the special
inquiry judge is to "sit as a judicial officer" to receive evidence presented
by the prosecuting attorney, the attorney general, or a special prosecutor. 17
Although a special inquiry investigation may proceed only under the
authority of a special inquiry judge, the Judicial Council expressly pro-
vided that the judge is not intended to play an "investigative role" in the
proceeding. 18
The special inquiry judge determines any rights or privileges that are
available to witnesses during the course of the proceedings. 19 Witnesses
before a special inquiry are informed of their right to have counsel present
to advise them concerning their testimony, and of their fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 20 If a witness then refuses to testify
under a right against self-incrimination, the special inquiry judge must
officers appointed by the court. Id. at § 54-47(f).
Unlike the Washington special inquiry judge, upon completion of an investigation a Connecticut one-
person grand jury must file a report of the proceedings with the court. Id. at § 54-47(g). The sole
function of the Connecticut one-person grand jury is to investigate and report the resulting findings to
the court and direct whether the report shall be made available to the public. Id. Like the Washington
special inquiry judge, the presiding judge at a Connecticut one-person grand jury proceeding is given
no power to issue an indictment. See id.
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.27.050 (1983).
14. Id. at § 10.27.170.
15. Id.; JUD. CouNct. REP., supra note 8, at 18.
16. Although the statute does not limit special inquiry investigations to the precharging stage, this
limitation was judicially imposed in State v. Manning, 86 Wn. 2d 272, 275,543 P.2d 632, 634 (1975).
17. JuD. CouNciL REP., supra note 8, at 18.
18. Id.
19. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.27.130 (1983) provides for a hearing regarding a witness' privilege
against self-incrimination. Special inquiry judges have also adopted the role of protecting generally the
rights of witnesses. Telephone interview with Judge Lloyd Bever, King County Superior Court, a
former special inquiry judge (March 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Judge Bever] (notes on
file with the Washington Law Review); interview with Judge Norman W. Quinn, King County Superior
Court, a former special inquiry judge (March 6, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Judge Quinn]
(notes on file with the Washington Law Review); telephone interview with Duane Evans, King County
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Feb. 22, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Interview'with Mr. Evans] (notes on
file with the Washington Law Review).
20. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.27.120 (1983).
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determine whether the privilege applies. If the witness has a legitimate
claim of privilege, the judge can compel the testimony, granting the
witness immunity from prosecution on the basis of the testimony given. 2l
The special inquiry judge has the authority to direct a public attorney 22 to
subpoena witnesses not called by the public attorney. 23 The judge also has
the power to personally question any witnesses appearing at the proceed-
ing. 24
The special inquiry judge makes no final decision at the close of the
special inquiry. 25 The decision as to whether charges are to be filed is left to
the prosecuting attorney.26
Section 10.27.180 of the Washington Code disqualifies a special inquiry
judge from presiding over "any subsequent court proceeding" arising from
the special inquiry, not including contempt proceedings. 27 The Neslund
court was asked to decide whether this section disqualifies a special inquiry
judge from issuing search warrants. 28
B. Constitutional Requirements of Magistrate Neutrality
The issuance of search warrants is limited by the constitutional right of
all persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ",29 The Washington constitu-
tion provides that "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law." 30
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment
as requiring that the magistrate be neutral and detached and that the
magistrate personally draw the inferences of probable cause necessary to
issue a search warrant. 31 In only three cases has the Supreme Court
21. Id. at § 10.27.130.
22. Id. at § 10.27.020(2) (defining the term "public attorney").
23. Id. at § 10.27.140(3).
24. Id. at § 10.27.170.
25. Interview with Judge Bever, supra note 19; Interview with Judge Quinn, supra note 19:
Interview with Mr. Evans, supra note 19.
26. Only the grand jury has power to issue indictments. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.150 (1983);
JUD. COUNCIL REP., supra note 8, at 18. Information obtained through a special inquiry investigation is
used by the prosecution just as evidence collected by other means. The prosecuting attorney determines
whether all evidence available from all sources is sufficient to support a charge. Interview with Judge
Bever, supra note 19.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.180 (1983).
28. Neshnd, 103 Wn. 2d at 82, 690 P.2d at 1155.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.




invalidated search warrants based upon a finding that the magistrate was
not sufficiently neutral and detached.
The Supreme Court found that a magistrate was not neutral and detached
under the facts of Coolidge v. New Hampshire.32 In Coolidge, the search
warrant was issued by the Attorney General who also led the investigation
and served as chief prosecutor at the resulting trial. 33 The Court reasoned
that prosecutors and police officers should not be expected to maintain
neutrality concerning their own investigations since, as law enforcement
officers, their attention should focus upon the investigation of crime and the
apprehension of criminals. 34 The Coolidge Court established the require-
ment that a search warrant be issued only by a neutral and detached
magistrate upon proof of probable cause. 35
In Connally v. Georgia,36 the Supreme Court invalidated a search
warrant because the issuing magistrate's own financial interests depended
upon the outcome of the probable cause determination. Under the Georgia
procedure, the magistrate was compensated for each search warrant issued,
but received no compensation for a determination that no probable cause
existed to support a warrant. 37 This personal financial interest destroyed the
magistrate's neutrality and detachment. 38
Finally, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 39 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a search warrant because the issuing magistrate subsequently partici-
pated with the investigating officer in executing the warrant. In Lo-Ji, the
magistrate issued a general search warrant for obscene materials, then
accompanied the investigation team to the site of the search to determine
which materials could properly be seized.40 The Supreme Court stated that
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it had become difficult to
distinguish between when the magistrate was acting as a neutral and
detached judicial officer and when he was stepping over the line of neu-
trality and joining the investigation as a member of the law enforcement
team.41
For the most part, state and lower federal courts have not invalidated
search warrants beyond the limited scope of the Supreme Court rulings. 42
32. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
33. Id. at 450.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 453.
36. 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
37. Id. at 246.
38. Id. at250-51.
39. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
40. Id. at 322.
41. Id. at 328.
42. There have, however, been two Georgia cases in which search warrants have been invalidated
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No Washington cases have invalidated search warrants for a lack of magis-
trate neutrality.
A number of state courts have even upheld the validity of search warrants
despite some prior association of the issuing magistrate with the investiga-
tion or prosecution. The Washington Court of Appeals held that a pros-
ecutor for one jurisdiction was competent to issue a search warrant in
another jurisdiction. 43 A Texas court upheld a warrant even though the
magistrate had served as the coroner who examined the allegedly murdered
decedent. 44 Judicial assistance provided to investigating officers in prepar-
ing an affidavit of probable cause did not invalidate a search warrant issued
on the basis of the affidavit, according to a West Virginia court and the Fifth
Circuit.45 Search warrants have also been upheld by a Montana court
despite the issuing magistrate's prior familiarity with the defendant, 46 and
by a New Hampshire court even when the magistrate had previously
represented the defendant on charges similar to those for which evidence
was sought under the warrant. 47
III. THE STATE v. NESLUND DECISION
On April 13, 198 1, a warrant was issued by Judge Linde of the San Juan
County District Court48 authorizing the search of the Rolf Neslund home
and property for evidence in the disappearance of Mr. Neslund. The
authorities suspected that Mr. Neslund had been murdered by his wife, the
defendant Ruth Neslund. This initial search revealed nothing.
On July 23, 1981, the San Juan County prosecuting attorney petitioned
for a special inquiry to investigate the matter. Judge Pitt presided over the
proceeding in the capacity of special inquiry judge, asking some questions
of one witness, Mrs. Neslund's brother. Judge Pitt did not subpoena any
for lack of magistrate neutrality. First, in State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22, 26 (1976).
rev'don other grounds sub noma. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3,235 S.E.2d 509(1977), the court found a
judge not neutral and detached due to his previous association with grand jury proceedings in the same
case and his expression of unfavorable opinions as to the defendants' honesty. Second, in Hawkins v.
State. 130 Ga. App. 426, 203 S.E.2d 622,623 (1973), the court held that a lieutenant in the local police
force could not issue a search warrant for another peace officer with the objectivity required of a neutral
and detached magistrate.
43. State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 564 P.2d 841 (1977).
44. See Deal v. State, 508 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. 1974).
45. See State v. Slonaker, 280 S.E.2d 212 (W. Va. 1981) (aid provided by the magistrate's
assistant); Albitez v. Beto, 465 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1972) (magistrate personally helped to draft the
affidavit).
46. See State v. Thomson, 169 Mont. 158, 545 P.2d 1070 (1976).
47. See State v. Mandravelis, 114 N.H. 634, 325 A.2d 794 (1974).




witnesses nor did he discuss the investigation or testimony with anyone
involved in the investigation.
On March 1, 1982, Judge Pitt issued a second warrant, warrant number
2123, for the search of defendant's residence and property. While execut-
ing the warrant, deputies discovered certain evidence not covered by the
warrant. In a telephonic affidavit, the deputy prosecutor requested that
testimony taken at the special inquiry, not yet transcribed, be incorporated
as evidence of probable cause to issue an additional search warrant. Judge
Pitt granted the additional warrant, warrant number 2123-1, on March 3,
1982. 49
Ruth Neslund was charged with first degree murder approximately one
year later.50 She moved to suppress the evidence seized under the warrants
2321 and 2321-1 because they were issued by Judge Pitt after commence-
ment of the special inquiry investigation over which he presided. The trial
court held that evidence seized pursuant to the warrants was admissible. 51
On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, the defendant argued that
all evidence obtained under warrants 2123 and 2123-1 should be sup-
pressed. 52 First, she argued that section 10.27.180 of the Washington Code
disqualified Judge Pitt from issuing search warrants 2123 and 2123-1
because in issuing the warrants the judge was "acting as a magistrate or
judge in [a] subsequent court proceeding arising from" the special inquiry
for which he served as special inquiry judge.53 Second, the defendant
argued that because he served as a special inquiry judge in the case, Judge
Pitt was not a "neutral and detached magistrate" as required by the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution, and by article 1, section 7 of
the Washington constitution. 54 Defendant argued that the magistrate's
neutrality and detachment were destroyed because he was controlled by the
49. Neslund, 103 Wn. 2d at 81, 690 P.2d at 1155. Judge Pitt later granted extensions of time for
execution of this warrant, first through March 8, 1982, then through March 11, 1982. The search was
completed on March 11, 1982. Id. at 82, 690 P.2d at 1155.
50. The information charging the defendant with first degree murder was filed on March 7, 1983.
Trial is pending.
51. Neslund, 103 Wn. 2d at 82, 690 P.2d at 1155. Evidence seized under warrants 2321 and 2321-1
was admitted with the exception of all documents, letters, files, records, photographic negatives, and
photographs in albums. Id.
52. Brief of Petitioner at 2, State v. Neslund, 103 Wn. 2d 79, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Brief of Petitioner].
53. Id. at 12-26, quoting from WASH. REv. CODE § 10.27.180 (1983).
54. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 26-41.
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prosecuting attorney and thus he could not make an independent deter-
mination of probable cause as required by Johnson v. United States.55 The
Washington Supreme Court rejected these arguments. 56
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Service as a Special Inquiry Judge Should Not Disqualify a
Magistrate From Issuing Search Warrants
There are two bases upon which the Neslund court might have deter-
mined that a special inquiry judge should be disqualified from issuing
search warrants in investigations for crimes subject to special inquiry
proceedings. First, section 10.27.180 of the Washington Code, which
disqualifies the special inquiry judge from acting as a magistrate or judge in
a "subsequent court proceeding" arising from the inquiry, might be con-
strued as a statutory bar. Alternatively, the exposure of the special inquiry
judge to the inquiry proceeding could be held to so bias the judge that the
Constitution requires the judge's disqualification from issuing search war-
rants for failure to meet the requirement of neutrality and detachment.
1. Section 10.27.180: Statutory Disqualification
Nothing in the Criminal Investigatory Act indicates that the legislature
considered the possibility of a special inquiry judge being called upon to
issue search warrants. Section 10.27.180 does not mention the issuance of
search warrants specifically. Although the general prohibition against a
special inquiry judge serving in a "subsequent court proceeding" might be
interpreted to prohibit the issuance of search warrants, such an interpreta-
tion is neither the most reasonable nor the most desirable construction of
the statute.
Section 10.27.180 disqualifies a special inquiry judge from "acting as a
magistrate or judge in any subsequent court proceeding arising from such
inquiry" except in contempt proceedings. The text of this section of the
statute provides three criteria for disqualifying a special inquiry judge from
serving an additional judicial function:(1) the additional function must be a
court proceeding; (2) it must be subsequent to the special inquiry; and (3) it
must arise from the special inquiry proceeding. The structure of the
provision suggests that all three of these criteria must be present to
disqualify a special inquiry judge from serving in an additional capacity.
55. 333 U.S. at 10, 14.
56. Nesund, 103 Wn. 2d at 83, 88, 690 P.2d at 1156, 1158.
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Special Inquiry Judge
The majority of the Neslund court found the timing of the search
warrants to be critical. Because the warrants were issued while the special
inquiry investigation was in progress, the court determined that their
issuance was not a "subsequent" proceeding within the meaning of the
statute and therefore, Judge Pitt was not disqualified from issuing them.57
This interpretation draws a distinction between a search warrant issued
during the course of a special inquiry investigation and one issued after the
special inquiry has been officially terminated. However, termination of a
special inquiry proceeding does not create a greater need for protection
against improper search warrants. Thus, the dissent's suggestion that
"subsequent" refers to proceedings occurring after commencement of a
special inquiry58 is most reasonable. The timing of the search warrant
process should not be a factor used to determine the validity of the search
warrant.
Even if the warrant issuing process is "subsequent" to the special
inquiry, the judge cannot be disqualified unless the subsequent proceeding
"aris[es] from" the special inquiry proceeding. This criterion requires a
factual nexus between the special inquiry investigation and the underlying
foundation of the later proceeding. In the case of a search warrant applica-
tion, issuance of a search warrant would arise out of the special inquiry
proceeding only if the evidence comprising probable cause to issue the
warrant was gathered through the special inquiry. The determination of
whether a subsequent proceeding arises out of the special inquiry must be
made on a case by case basis.
Under the facts stated in the Neslund opinion,59 it is unclear whether
application for search warrant 2123 arose out of the special inquiry.
However, since the affidavit of probable cause for search warrant 2123-1
incorporated by reference the testimony taken during the special inquiry,
the issuance of warrant 2123-1 clearly arose out of the inquiry and meets
the requirements of this second textual criterion.
The Neslund court, however, was correct in determining that Judge Pitt's
issuance of search warrants was proper under the statute. The issuance of a
search warrant was not a "court proceeding." The majority discussed the
definition of "proceeding" and determined that the term included "any act
done by authority of a court of law. "6 However, the Criminal Investigatory
Act disqualifies special inquiry judges from acting only in "any subsequent
court proceeding." Although the issuance of a search warrant is a proceed-
ing, the court should have analyzed the entire phrase and defined "court
57. Id. at 83, 690 P.2d at 1156.
58. Id. at 90, 690 P.2d at 1160.
59. Id. at 81, 690 P.2d at 1155.
60. Id. at 83, 690 P.2d at 1156, citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1083 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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proceeding" to exclude applications for and issuance of search warrants.
By so defining "court proceeding," the court would have drawn an impor-
tant distinction between search warrant proceedings and those proceedings
such as criminal trials which have been traditionally afforded the greatest
level of protection against possible prejudice.
It is proper for the legislature to take special precautions to ensure that no
prejudice be associated with the trial of a criminal defendant. The sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth specific protections
for the accused in criminal trials. 61 The Constitution provides strong
protections against prejudice in the determination of guilt or the sentencing
of convicted criminals.62 A defendant is guaranteed a fair trial before an
impartial jury. 63 Both the federal and Washington rules of evidence strictly
control what types of evidence are admissible at trial. 64 Exposure of a
criminal jury to unduly prejudicial information may be reversible error.65
Ex parte communications are improper between a party and a trial judge.66
Disqualification of a special inquiry judge from serving as the trial judge
properly prevents prior ex parte communications between the prosecution
and the special inquiry judge from prejudicing a subsequent criminal trial.
A search warrant proceeding is inherently different from a criminal trial,
however, and does not require the same level of protection. The presence of
hearsay or prejudicial evidence in a search warrant application generally
does not invalidate the resulting search warrant. 67 While ex parte
61. The text of the amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
63. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
64. For example, Rule 402 provides that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. WASH. R. EvID. 402;
FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule 802 provides that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, except as otherwise
provided in the rules of evidence. WASH. R. EvID. 802; FED. R. EVID. 802. See generally WASH. R.
EVID. and FED. R. EVID..
65. There are countless cases that reverse criminal convictions because the convicting jury was
exposed to prejudicial evidence. In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court reversed a conviction on the grounds that evidence of prior convictions obtained against the
defendant who had no assistance of counsel was improperly admitted. In State v. Robinson, 24 Wn. 2d
909, 167 P.2d 986 (1946), the court reversed the defendant's conviction because the jury had been
exposed to immaterial, prejudicial information.
66. The Washington Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge should "neither initiate nor
consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding." WASH.
CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) (1984). See also 48 C.J.S. Judges § 36 (1955) (stating that "a
judge should take reasonable precaution to avoid extrajudicial contact with pending or impending cases
or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding").




communications are improper in the context of a trial, the issuance of a
search warrant occurs entirely on the basis of ex parte communications
between the prosecution or investigating officers and the magistrate. In
many instances, the purpose of issuing a search warrant for an unan-
nounced search would be defeated by notice to the potential defendant or
owner of the premises encompassed by the search. Since ex parte com-
munications are proper in the issuance of a search warrant, the ex parte
nature of the special inquiry itself should not prejudice the search warrant
proceeding.
The Neslund court properly declined to preclude special inquiry judges
from issuing search warrants on statutory grounds. The court's justification
of its determination by defining "subsequent court proceeding" to exclude
proceedings occurring before the conclusion of the special inquiry is
plausible. However, this explanation unnecessarily limits the holding to
cases in which a search warrant is issued before the close of the inquiry. The
court's position could be strengthened by defining the term "court proceed-
ing" to exclude the application for and issuance of search warrants.
2. Constitutional Considerations
After determining that the Criminal Investigatory Act did not disqualify
Judge Pitt from issuing search warrants while serving as a special inquiry
judge in the Neslund investigation, the court turned its attention to the
constitutionality of Judge Pitt's actions.
The United States Constitution requires that search warrants be issued by
a neutral and detached magistrate. Constitutional disqualification from
serving a judicial function should be based upon some indication that the
neutrality and detachment of the magistrate has been destroyed. The
defendant in Neslund charged that Judge Pitt's service as a special inquiry
judge had this effect. 68
In a situation where a special inquiry judge issues search warrants, four
factors might destroy neutrality and detachment. First, the magistrate
might have a personal interest in the outcome of the probable cause
determination. 69 Second, the magistrate's role as special inquiry judge may
be so closely associated with the investigation and prosecution of the case
that the magistrate is unable to scrutinize evidence of probable cause in a
neutral fashion. 70 Third, the magistrate might be so influenced by the
search warrant because inadmissible or prejudicial evidence was included in an affidavit of probable
cause or revealed to the issuing magistrate.
68. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 52, at 26.
69. This was the situation in Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977). See also text accompany-
ing notes 44-45.
70. This was the case in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
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prosecution as to abdicate the duty of determining whether probable cause
exists. 7 1 Finally, the magistrate might be exposed to information that could
unduly prejudice the determination of probable cause. 72
a. Personal Interest
The first neutrality-destroying factor, personal interest in the outcome of
the probable cause determination, is not implicated in the Neslund case, nor
is it a particular concern generally in situations where a special inquiry
judge later serves as a magistrate. Under the Washington special inquiry
system and the procedure for issuing search warrants, there is no provision
for disparate compensation depending upon the outcome of a probable
cause determination, as was struck down in Connally v. Georgia.73 More-
over, the special inquiry process does not give the judge a role as an
advocate or investigator, a role which might prejudice a subsequent deter-
mination of probable cause.
b. Affiliation with the Prosecution
The second factor that would require disqualification arises if a special
inquiry judge were to become so closely affiliated with law enforcement as
to destroy the judge's neutrality as a magistrate. Such a prejudicial affilia-
tion would be tenable only if the role of the special inquiry judge and the
nature of the special inquiry proceeding fostered a prejudicial association
between the judge and the prosecution.
Each special inquiry judge is a superior court judge elected by a majority
of the judges in the county.74 Special inquiry judges are generally experi-
enced members of the judiciary, accustomed to presiding over judicial
proceedings in an impartial manner.75
The special inquiry judge does not play an investigatory role in the
special inquiry proceeding.76 The judge has none of the personal motiva-
tions that give a prosecuting attorney a necessarily adversarial bias: the
inquiry judge receives no particular credit if an investigation reveals useful
information or leads to a successful prosecution. The judge cannot be
New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 32-35. 39-41.
7 1. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
72. This factor was implied in the arguments of the Neslund dissent. Neshnd, 103 Wn. 2d at
93-94, 690 P.2d at 1161 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). However, exposure of the magistrate to prejudicial
information has never been cited as a reason to invalidate a search warrant.
73. Connally, 429 U.S. at 250.
74. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.27.040 (1983).
75. Interview with Judge Quinn. supra note 19.
76. JUD. COUNCIL REP., supra note 8, at 18.
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accused of failure to perform any duty should the investigation prove
fruitless. Although the special inquiry judge is authorized to call and
question witnesses, like a trial judge the inquiry judge is likely to use the
power only to clarify points raised by the prosecution or to ensure a forum
for exculpatory evidence as well as the incriminatory evidence sought by
the prosecution. The judge is unlikely to question witnesses to elicit
incriminatory evidence in aid of the prosecution, since the judge is not in a
position to do so as effectively as is the prosecuting attorney. A special
inquiry judge has no access to the investigation file, 77 is generally not
familiar with the prosecution's strategy, and knows nothing about the case
beyond the testimony of witnesses called before the special inquiry pro-
ceeding.
The association between the special inquiry judge and the investigating
officers is generally no closer than that between a presiding judge and the
prosecuting attorney at a criminal trial, or between the magistrate issuing a
search warrant and the investigating officer who executes the warrant. 78
Indeed, because the special inquiry is an ex parte proceeding like the search
warrant application proceeding, the judge serves as a check on the prosecu-
tion. The judge ensures adherence to statutory and constitutional limita-
tions on the scope of investigation. 79
c. Potential Control of the Judge by the Prosecution
A third argument, asserted by the defendant in Neslund, was that a
special inquiry Judge might be effectively controlled by the prosecution.
The defendant asserted that language in the Judicial Council Report which
proposed the Criminal Investigatory Act exhibits an intent that the special
inquiry judge be controlled by the prosecution. 80 The Judicial Council
stated that the special inquiry judge would provide the prosecution with an
"added investigatory tool" by enabling the prosecutor to obtain evidence
from witnesses under oath, under the supervision of ajudicial officer.81 The
defendant argued that this sentence establishes the judge as a tool of the
prosecution.
The language of the Judicial Council Report supports a theory of
prosecutorial control over the special inquiry judge only if taken out of the
77. Interview with Judge Bevers, supra note 19; Interview with Judge Quinn, supra note 19.
78. The judges interviewed stated that there is generally no undue alliance between the judge and
the prosecution, and no problem of prejudice in favor of the prosecution. Interview with Judge Bever,
supra note 19; Interview with Judge Quinn, supra note 19; telephone interview with Judge Frank
Howard, King County Superior Court, a former special inquiry judge (March 6, 1985) (notes on file
with the Washington Law Review); Interview with Mr. Evans, supra note 19.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 89-90.
80. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7, State v. Neslund, 103 Wn. 2d 79, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984).
81. JUD. COUNCIL REP., supra note 8, at 18.
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context of the paragraph in which it appears. It is clear from the language
surrounding discussion of the special inquiry judge's role that the judge is
to be neutral and not under the control of the investigating or prosecuting
officers. In the same paragraph that the "tool" language appears, the
Judicial Council explained that under the proposed statute the special
inquiry judge would "only sit as a judicial officer" 82 and "not actively
participat[e] in an investigative role." 83
The "tool" language of the Judicial Council Report can be explained so
as to be consistent with the otherwise neutral role of the special inquiry
judge. The special inquiry proceeding provides an investigatory tool by
facilitating the gathering of evidence, in much the same sense as a search
warrant proceeding may be said to provide a tool to the prosecution by
allowing a search under proper circumstances. Both the special inquiry
judge and the magistrate fulfill necessary functions in the process of
allowing investigating officers and prosecuting attorneys to acquire infor-
mation concerning crime. Properly fulfilled, neither role is unduly biased
in favor of or allied with the prosecution, although both serve in the
investigation of crime.
d. Exposure of the Special Inquiry Judge to Prejudicial Evidence
A final argument put forth by the Neslund dissent is that a special inquiry
judge is "exposed to rumor, innuendo and unfounded testimony from
inquiry witnesses" during the course of the special inquiry, implying that
this information could not have come to the judge's attention solely through
the search warrant application process. 84 This theory presumes that there
exist certain types of information with which a magistrate cannot be
presented without creating bias.
Most types of information that might be presented to a magistrate can
actually be considered in determining probable cause to issue a search
warrant. It is well established that a search warrant need not be based upon
evidence admissible at trial. 85 For example, hearsay is sufficient basis for a
warrant so long as the issuing magistrate is informed of some of the




84. Neslund, 103 Wn. 2d at 93-94, 690 P.2d at 1161-62.
85. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Chacon v. State. 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957):
Perez v. State, 81 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1955); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
86. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v.





Even evidence that is not competent to support a finding of probable
cause has been held not to prejudice the magistrate who hears or reads it.87
Some classes of information should not be considered in making a deter-
mination of probable cause: evidence obtained during an illegal search, 88 as
the product of an illegal arrest, 89 or mere rumor.90 However, no case
suggests that such evidence prejudices a magistrate.
Because courts have never invalidated a search warrant on the grounds
that the issuing magistrate was exposed to incompetent evidence, even
when such evidence might have been unfavorable to the individual
searched, there is no precedent for invalidation of a search warrant issued
by a special inquiry judge based upon exposure to evidence during the
special inquiry process.
B. Analysis of the Role of the Special Inquiry Judge
There is little case law or tradition establishing the parameters of the
power entrusted to the special inquiry judge. The role of the special inquiry
judge should be based on similar judicial roles, such as that of the trial
judge and the magistrate who issues search warrants.
The special inquiry judge is endowed with the power to compel the
cooperation of witnesses before the special inquiry proceeding. At the
same time the judge bears the burden of limiting the prosecutor's intrusion
into the private affairs of the citizens affected by the investigation. Without
the oversight of the special inquiry judge, witnesses might be subjected to
harrassment, embarrassment, burdensome examinations beyond the proper
scope of the inquiry, and invasions of their constitutionally protected
privileges by an overzealous prosecutor. The special inquiry judge's au-
thority to rule upon all questions of privilege and immunity provides a
readily available forum for questions or grievances raised by witnesses or
their counsel. Thus the role of the special inquiry judge involves a balance
between facilitating the investigation and limiting that investigation to the
scope and procedures permissible under the Criminal Investigatory Act
and the United States and Washington Constitutions. 91
The role of a special inquiry judge during the inquiry proceeding bears a
close resemblance to that of the trial judge. At both the trial and the special
87. Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952).
88. See People v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 489,79 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Meadows, 222 Pa. Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365 (1972).
89. See People v. Nabers, 103 Mich. App. 354, 303 N.W.2d 205 (1981).
90. See United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976);
Elardo v. State, 164 Miss. 628, 145 So. 615 (1933); Lakes v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 266, 254 S.W.
980 (1923).
91. See text accompanying note 79.
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inquiry proceeding, the judge is charged with ensuring propriety of the
procedure and compliance with the applicable rules of conduct. 92 In both,
the judge is available as an authority to whom questions of admissibility of
evidence, propriety of questions, applicability of privileges, rights of
witnesses, and other questions of fact or law may be referred. In both
instances, the judge plays primarily a passive role, participating in the
proceedings only in circumstances in which judicial advice is required. 93
The role of the special inquiry judge in protecting the rights of the public,
the witnesses and persons under investigation is also similar to that fulfilled
by the magistrate in determining probable cause before issuing a search
warrant. The process of submitting evidence to a magistrate for a deter-
mination of probable cause before proceeding with a search serves as a
check on the power of the government to search and seize. The introduction
of a neutral judicial officer into the process of government intrusion into
individual privacy is traditionally thought to protect the public and ensure
fairness and legitimacy in governmental actions. The presence of a neutral
judicial officer during the special inquiry process serves much the same
function.
The role of the special inquiry judge should be that of a neutral judicial
officer. So long as a judge fulfills this role as intended under the Criminal
Investigatory Act, service as a special inquiry judge should in no way
prejudice a later determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant.
C. Case-By-Case Examination of Magistrate Neutrality and
Detachment is Necessary and Proper for Constitutionally Valid
Search Warrants
The Neslund court rejected statutory and constitutional claims and
refused to disqualify all special inquiry judges from issuing search war-
rants. However, the decision did not relieve special inquiry judges of the
requirement of neutrality and detachment. The court recognized that each
case should be examined individually to ensure that the issuing magistrate
is neutral and detached as required by the Constitution. 94 A case by case
examination is a proper check for potential prejudice. Such an examination
provides sufficient safeguards against abuse without unduly limiting the
ability of an unbiased judge to properly serve in a judicial capacity as both
special inquiry judge and warrant issuing magistrate.
92. WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDuCT, Canon 3(A)(2) and (3) (1984).
93. For example, judicial advice is required when a question arises as to whether a special inquiry
witness may claim a privilege.




In assessing the neutrality and detachment of a magistrate on a case-by-
case basis, a reviewing court should consider the same factors95 that test the
constitutionality of issuance of search warrants by judges: (1) an individual
special inquiry judge issuing a search warrant must have no personal
interest in the outcome of the probable cause determination; (2) the magis-
trate must not become so closely associated with the investigation and
prosecution as to lose the requisite neutrality; and (3) the magistrate must
personally make the probable cause determination. Because exposure to
additional information is generally not a basis for disqualifying a magis-
trate,96 exposure to the special inquiry proceeding and communications
between the prosecution and the judge should be reviewed only for evi-
dence of undue influence or coercion and should not itself be presumed an
indication of bias.
In analyzing the relationship between the special inquiry judge and the
prosecution, a reviewing court should investigate the actions of the judge
during the special inquiry procedure to ensure that those actions conform to
the role of a neutral judicial officer. The standards of conduct for a special
inquiry judge should closely parallel those of a trial judge. The judge
should not become unnecessarily involved in the investigation of crime or
the interrogation of witnesses. Although a judge may properly call or
question witnesses, this power should be left primarily to the prosecution,
as it is at trial.
Review of a magistrate's neutrality and detachment is left to the judge-
ment of the reviewing court and its interpretation of precedent. Coolidge97
and Lo-Ji Sales98 do not clearly define the parameters of permissible
magistrate involvement, but they do offer some guidance. A reviewing
court must balance several considerations: the necessity of a special inquiry
judge's involvement in the investigation of crime, the practical necessity of
the dual role of special inquiry judge and magistrate in the individual
situation, and the interest in protecting a search warrant application process
from possible bias.
In evaluating the influence of a prosecutor or investigating officer over
the magistrate issuing a search warrant, the reviewing court must determine
whether the magistrate has made an independent determination of probable
cause as set forth in Johnson v. United States.99 If the magistrate does not
95. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
97. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
99. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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make an independent determination, the search warrant must be invali-
dated. 100
Under the current Washington special inquiry system, the fact that a
magistrate serves as a special inquiry judge in the case does little to affect
the magistrate's neutrality and detachment. The actual functions of the
special inquiry judge are closely analogous to those of a trial judge, and
superior court judges chosen to serve as special inquiry judges should act
according to the same standards of judicial responsibility required of them
as trial judges. 101
V. CONCLUSION
The special inquiry proceeding provides a fair and reasonable oppor-
tunity for Washington state law enforcement officials to gather information
regarding crime and corruption. The mandatory presence of a neutral
judicial officer at the proceeding protects the rights of the witnesses called
to provide information. It also ensures fairness in the process and adherence
to the rules set forth by the legislature to govern such proceedings.
A search warrant should not be deemed invalid solely because it is issued
by a magistrate who has also served as a special inquiry judge. There is no
indication that the special inquiry judge was intended to be anything but a
neutral figure in a special inquiry proceeding. Nothing in the functions or
experiences of a special inquiry judge is likely so to destroy the judge's
neutrality as to render the judge incapable of making a fair and impartial
determination of probable cause. Ordinarily, a special inquiry judge is not
unduly allied with the prosecution during the special inquiry proceeding,
nor is a special inquiry judge exposed to information which could not have
been presented to that judge in the process of applying for a search warrant.
The essence of any judge's role is the ability to make reasonable
determinations of law based upon whatever competent evidence is pre-
sented. It is not unusual for a judge to be required to disregard incompetent
evidence, personal knowledge or prior experience in making such a deter-
mination. There is no reason to expect that, in practice, a judge presiding
over a special inquiry investigation is any more susceptible to bias or
alliance with the prosecution than a trial judge or a magistrate would be.
There is a strong presumption that both the trial judge and the magistrate
act as fair and impartial judicial officers, and the determinations of such
officers can be overturned only upon proof that those determinations were
100. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
101. Interview with Judge Quinn, supra note 19; Interview with Mr. Evans, supra note 19. For




erroneous or that the decision maker was biased. This presumption should
be extended to the special inquiry judge as well.
Any situations of actual prejudice or lack of sufficient probable cause
should be dealt with on those grounds, rather than by the sweeping
disqualification of all special inquiry judges from issuing search warrants.
Alice M. Wright
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